This article traces the development of the author's evolving ideas and proposals, developed 
During that first visit in 2004, I had no idea where my initial plan would take me and I had no training in Mediation/Conflict intervention. That started in June 2010. What I did have, was an abiding interest in and concern for the situation in Northern Ireland and the protracted conflict over the previous thirty years or more and had followed closely the peace process which had finally brought an end to the violence. It is only in retrospect that I have attached theoretical principles and concepts to this ongoing process. During the decades of the most recent "troubles" in Ireland, I
followed the course of the conflict closely, and made efforts in a very small, but direct and individual way, to increase understanding between communities and to influence the evolving Peace Process.
Initial Visit to Mali: Festival au Desert, 2004
Having become interested in the Tuareg people in 1991, I travelled to During that first visit in 2004, I experienced the landscape and conditions in Mali as a series of visual and sensory avalanches, which initially nearly overwhelmed me. In subsequent visits, I have seen the same impact on others visiting for the first time. I was also struck by the parallels between Ireland and Mali; the many cultural, social and ethnic riches, including music and dance, ancient seats of learning and a wicked sense of humour, alongside colonisation, famine, protracted armed conflict and, in the mid-late 1990's, impressive efforts, initially successful, to construct a lasting peace.
Flamme de la Paix, Timbuktu
Learning, in 2004, of the armed conflict which ranged from 1991-1996, and the apparently successful Peace Treaty of 1996, it struck me that we in Ireland and the armed groups, (e.g. the IRA [Irish Republican Army]), could learn a lot from the way the parties in Mali had reached agreement.
We could also learn from the way they had achieved decommissioning of weapons, to the extent that, essentially, all the weapons had been destroyed. That was, of course, not the complete reality; I learned much later that not all rebel weapons had been put beyond use. However, it prompted my first foray into considering a conflict intervention linkage between Mali and Ireland.
The signing of the Peace Treaty was celebrated with a massive bonfire in Timbuktu, visible for hundreds of kilometres, giving a powerful signal to those out in the desert that the conflict was over. The fire burned for three days; many combatants came from the desert and threw their newly-Page | 86 redundant weapons on the bonfire. Thousands of weapons burned in the blaze. Subsequently, a huge monument was raised where the bonfire had burned; this monument and the bonfire are known as La Flamme de la Paix, the Flame of Peace. The charred remains of many of the weapons destroyed in the bonfire are preserved in the monument, and are clearly visible at the foot of the great structure.
Even from that first visit, I started to explore what I might do, within my limitations as just one individual, to develop links between Ireland and Mali.
The Stalled Decommissioning Process in Northern Ireland
Following renewal of the IRA ceasefire in July 1997, the Good Friday Agreement was ultimately signed in April 1998 and subsequently endorsed throughout the island of Ireland in joint referenda in May 1998. Elections to a new Northern Ireland Assembly were held in June 1998. The issue of decommissioning continued to impede progress to the devolution of powers from Westminster to Stormont, and the deadline in October 1998 for the formation of the Executive was missed. Further attempts to implement the Good Friday Agreement during 1998 and much of 1999 also failed (Melaugh, n.d.) . This was largely due to the stalled process of decommissioning.
Powers were finally devolved from Westminster to Belfast in December 1999 and the various institutions outlined in the Agreement were established. There was a series of reviews of the working of the Agreement and several suspensions of the institutions of devolved government.
In October 2001, the IRA announced that it had begun to decommission its weapons (Melaugh, n.d.) . This was repeated in April 2002 and October 2003, but no final decommissioning was in sight. The stalemate continued for a number of years, and seemed an interminable and insoluble "roadblock" to advancement of the Peace Process. It was against this background that I first heard of the Flamme de la Paix.
Decommissioning Conference 2004
My first effort towards a conflict intervention initiative was to try to make the parties to the conflict in Ireland aware of the achievement of the Malian Government and the Tuareg in ending their conflict, and in decommissioning their weapons. I started to research and establish contacts towards organising a Conference in Ireland, to which would be invited the various parties to the conflict in Mali from 1991-1996 and participants in their Peace Treaty negotiations. The aim was that parties to the Northern Ireland conflict, particularly the IRA, who were "hesitant" about decommissioning, might learn directly and jointly from the Tuareg and the Malian government, how they had achieved decommissioning so quickly and effectively and then might be influenced to follow suit. The added bonus of this Conference would be that the direction of assistance towards achieving peace would be from Mali to Ireland; that is, from "global South" to "global North", a neat reversal of the usual aid direction.
Having received support in principle from the UN Representative who had facilitated the peace talks in 1996, and having suggested the proposal to a number of people with access to relevant high-level personnel in Mali, my plan was happily rendered redundant in July 2005, when the IRA issued a statement announcing an end to its armed campaign and instructing all IRA units to dump arms. In September 2005, the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning announced that the IRA had completed the decommissioning of all of its arms (Melaugh, n.d.) .
Proposal for an International Peace Conference in Bamako/Timbuktu
A low-grade renewal of fighting began in Northern Mali in May 2006, which "at first, appeared to be a limited affair. Yet it underscored shifts in Malian Governance in the North that bore the hallmarks of the country's future collapse" in 2012 (Thurston, A, and Lebovich, A, 2013:24) .
Visiting Mali for the third time in November 2006, I noted increasing tensions between the Tuareg minority and the Malian Government. I began to consider how best to promote understanding and solidarity between the two key parties. I was becoming aware that both parties saw the peace treaties they had signed as ends in themselves; that is, they were working on durable, sustainable peace and reconciliation being immediately achieved through a single peace treaty, rather than through long-term commitment to a comprehensive and on-going peace process (Corry, 2014) . 
Mapping the Conflict
The conflict in Mali is highly complex, arising from structural factors, such as poverty and poor governance, perceived marginalisation, and many other issues; it is not possible in this article to However, while it is widely acknowledged that the Tuareg rebels have re-kindled armed conflict, Mali's conflict is not just related to the so-called "Tuareg problem", but has wider and more complex roots (Whitehouse, 2013) , and the structural issues referred to above affect not only the Tuareg, but also all the different ethnicities in Northern Mali and to a lesser extent in the south. In addition, the issues of the slave trade and current forms of indentured service, involving the black Bella people, tend to be glossed over. The renewed armed conflict in 2012 saw resurgence of inter-generational slavery, though some assert that it was a simple question of various armed groups recruiting child soldiers.
The Tuareg fear the disappearance of their rich traditional culture and nomadic lifestyle.
There are also internal intra-ethnic tensions within the very strict hierarchical clan structures of the Tuareg. Previous "serfs" are now in powerful positions in public administration, while the higherstatus groups are, by and large, uneducated and mired in poverty.
It would seem that only a minority of Tuareg choose rebellion and independence, the majority seeking merely to survive the extreme conditions of their beloved lifestyle and to live life in peace. It is apparent that non-rebelling, civilian Tuareg are seriously disadvantaged by the conflict, ending up each time the conflict erupts, as refugees in neighbouring countries, or internally displaced within Mali.
The main active rebel group, the MNLA (Movement National de Liberation del Azawad), emerged in October 2011 out of many other groups over the past fifty years. They portray themselves as secular democratic separatists, not motivated by religious zeal. The proposed new independent state, to be called Azawad, would theoretically bring prosperity through income from reported oil, petrol and gas reserves. However, the existence and exploitability of such resources is not fully proven (Studer, 2013 , Whitehouse, 2013 We were invited by MINUSMA to join a Prime Ministerial two-day mission to Gao, where we saw at first hand the limited nature of Government rule in the far North-East town of Kidal.
We spoke to a number of groups in Gao, including women's groups, and attended the Reconciliation session of the "Assizes du Nord", a series of public, inclusive meetings designed to start the process of inter-ethnic and inter-community dialogue.
In these meetings and interviews, we explored the desire for and possibility of a variety of Track Two and/or Track Three initiatives, seeking organisations and individuals with whom Glencree might partner if any initiative were to be established. Currently, the final report of the visit and an updated conflict analysis are being prepared. Should any interventions be recommended, these will need to be approved and funding secured before any commitment can be given to the establishment of any initiative.
If ultimately this is achieved, then I feel I will have succeeded in my dogged ambition to offer to Mali and the parties in conflict there, the experience and expertise gained in this country from our own experience of conflict, resolution and efforts to achieve long-term reconciliation.
